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file
UNITED STATES MISSION
TO THE
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
(USNATO)

MEMORANDUM

December 28, 1973

TO: The Ambassador
THROUGH: DCM - Mr. McAuliffe
FROM: POLAD - James E. Goodby *JEG*
SUBJECT: Proposal by Gerry Helman for Combining USEC
and USNATO

I thought you might be interested in seeing the attached paper by Gerry Helman. Beginning on page 3 of the paper he has some suggestions for a "super Ambassador" to handle relations with Europe. He is suggesting that USNATO and USEC be placed under one head, with a deputy to handle each of the current functions of USNATO and USEC.

Attachment:
Mr. Helman's paper.

Add Trade Rep
12/28/73
POLAD:JEGoodby:e 12/28/73

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LIVING WITH EUROPE

The Problem

1. There are a broad range of issues-- security, political, economic-- on which the U.S. and the countries of the E.C. must deal with one another, both in the short term as far as specific negotiations are concerned and as part of a process of long-term association.

2. This requirement has been recognized both in the United States proposal for a declaration of principles, and in the various comments issued by leaders on both sides of the Atlantic that better Atlantic consultative machinery is needed. As far as is known, however, no proposals have been put forward for regularizing consultations. Currently, they are being conducted in the same fashion as in the past:

--security issues are dealt with largely in N.A.T.O., with variations such as the "bilateral" dialogue within N.A.T.O. between the Eurogroup and the U.S. and liaison arrangements between Allied and French forces.

--political issues are considered bilaterally, through special arrangements such as The Bonn Group (on German questions) and in N.A.T.O. As far as N.A.T.O. is concerned, there seems again to be a determination that more intensive political consultations will take place, a vow frequently made.



--economic questions are dealt with in the O.E.C.D., in specialized fora such as the Group of Ten (and smaller); bilaterally with various E.C. countries; and "bilaterally" with the E.C. itself.

3. The argument can be ~~xxx~~ made that new international machinery is needed which will deal comprehensively with Atlantic community problems. Such proposals are at best premature because:

--The E.C. countries combine slow reaction time with a low threshold of suspicion. Both factors are certain to lead to an exacerbation ~~ix~~ rather than to an improvement of U.S.-E.C. relations should the U.S. put forward a blueprint for new machinery or for a radical reorganization of what exists. Europe's conclusion is too likely to be that U.S.-proposed machinery is designed to advance U.S. hegemony.

--as far as the U.S. is concerned, there is a substantial problem of whether we confront "~~none~~" or "one" in any ^{new} formal organization. "~~None~~" will result in a gaggle hardly better than what is available now in a variety of organizations. And "one" just does not exist, and there is no telling when it will.

--It would be difficult to fit Greece, Turkey and Norway into any new machinery. This would have serious security consequences for the U.S. and for Europe, although Europe would as soon sidestep them.



--It would be difficult to fit Japan into the picture.

4. What is required, rather, are measures which

--the U.S. can undertake unilaterally and in so doing set an example which others will be encouraged to follow.

--encourage E.C. integration, without manifestly forcing the pace, through anticipating by one step the evolution of the E.C. countries into an increasingly integrated economic, ~~xxx~~ political and security establishment.

--leave the way open for further Atlantic institutional development, if desired, or other options the U.S. may want to encourage;

--do not weaken existing institutions such as N.A.T.O.;

--allow participation by Japan, Turkey, Greece, Norway and Canada on those subjects of interest to them.

The Proposal

1. The United States should reorganize its establishment in Brussels by combining its Missions to N.A.T.O. and the European Communities under a single head, the Special Representative of the U.S. He would be in charge of all U.S. interests in Europe that concern regional Western European activities.



2. In announcing the reorganization, the following elements could be specified:

--the move is taken to enhance the ability of the U.S. to negotiate with the E.C. and its members on the full range of common questions.

--the Special Representative's mandate would be the declaration of principles worked out with the E.C. and within N.A.T.O.

--the intent is to improve U.S. ability to consult, through the institutions which now exist, and to demonstrate U.S. readiness and willingness to do so.

--while the arrangement is unique in international affairs, it is appropriate to the wide range of tasks which exist and to the special relationship which exists between the U.S. and the countries of the E.C.

--the U.S. would welcome a similar arrangement on the part of the E.C. in Washington. The U.S. is prepared to consider any ~~far~~ future institutional arrangements which others might desire.

3. In the announcement, much of the detail~~s~~ of the reorganization might be revealed, as follows:

--the Special Representative will have an office in Brussels and in Washington.

--In Washington, he will have the position of Under-secretary of State. He will have a seat on the N.S.C., and chair ^{an} ~~an~~ inter-agency committee on which will be represented those branches of the government which deal with European questions.



--In Brussels, he will have as deputies two persons with ambassadorial rank: one for regional security and political affairs, who would be the Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council; and one for Economic Affairs, who would deal with the E.C. on those matters, would also be Ambassador to the O.E.C.D., and represent the U.S. in discussions on energy.

--At least a portion of the Special Representative's staff will be "dual-based" to ensure that the U.S. Government is fully capable of dealing with all elements of ~~our~~^{its} relations with Europe.

4. The announcement might further include some additional elements of policy:

--the continued importance of N.A.T.O. could be reaffirmed, as well as the importance attached to the Northern and Southern flanks of N.A.T.O.

--Japan could be invited to establish a comparable office in Brussels (excluding, of course, ~~xxx~~ participation in N.A.T.O., but with the implicit possibility of joining in discussions covering political, energy, and environmental questions.)

5. While ~~we~~^{it} would not announce them, the U.S. would maintain the following additional options:

--the U.S. might establish a comparable agency in Japan, and invite the E.C. to do the same;



--annual U.S.-Japan-E.C. meetings at the Foreign Minister level might be held to discuss ~~xxx~~ outstanding issues, but with a single E.C. spokesman.

